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Today's headlines constantly reverberate with the news of
copyright owners' legal assault on peer-to-peer networks (P2P) and
the users trading music files over them. Every few weeks, the
Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA) initiates a mass
round of lawsuits, their latest (at the time this note went into
publication) targeting 754 of the largest P2P copyright violators.' This
battle pitting copyright owners against consumers is taking place
across the globe and will be played out in the courts of many
countries. It will affect thousands of people's lives, sometimes
resulting in the prosecution or legal harassment of the innocent and
undeserving. This note will demonstrate how the struggle over
shared music is a test of the current copyright regime and will
influence how copyrighted information disperses through the
internet. The outcome will influence international copyright law as it
struggles to accommodate the transnational possibilities for
infringement engendered by the internet, as well as the structure and
transparency of the internet itself.
Copyright has long been recognized internationally as a means
for stimulating intellectual and creative innovation.2 Some even
* J.D. Candidate, University of California, Hastings College of the Law, 2005;
B.A., Pitzer College, 2000. The author would like to thank his family and Veronica
Briggs for their patience and support, and the HICLR staff for their editorial
assistance.
1. Tony Smith, RIAA Sues 754 More P2Pers, THEREGISTER.COM, (Dec. 17,
2004) , available at <http://www.theregister.co.uk/2004/12/17/riaasues_754/>.
2. See WILLIAM W. FISHER III, PROMISES TO KEEP: TECHNOLOGY, LAW, AND
THE FUTURE OF ENTERTAINMENT (forthcoming 2004) (manuscript at Ch. 6)
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equate copyright with the spread of democracy and self-
representation.3 However, as copyright becomes more proprietary
and commoditized in the age of multinational corporations, the
benefits shift to the copyright owners, away from the class of people
who were intended to benefit the most from copyright: the public.
International copyright treaties have focused more on copyright as a
product in global trade than as fuel for global innovation. This focus
has resulted in the atrophy of the doctrine of fair use and threatens to
undermine the traditional justification for copyright. Copyright
encourages a thriving cultural and intellectual atmosphere by
ensuring creators a return on their labor investment. A
commoditized copyright, however, prevents derivative creators from
making subsequent innovations and discourages a lively and creative
public environment.
I make no moral judgment in this note about the "sharing" of
music files over P2P. Instead, I view the current situation as a
microcosm of the tension between copyright and technologies that
allow unprecedented ease of data communications on a global scale.
Ethical or unethical, file-sharing will affect the direction of copyright
law and how the instrumentalities of global communication are used.
Argument
The international nature of the internet creates jurisdictional
quagmires for copyright owners seeking to enforce copyrights
globally. While international agreements attempt to bridge these
jurisdictional gaps and establish uniform enforcement of copyrights
among trading partners, data havens - sites that operate outside of
traditional jurisdictions because of geographic, technological, or
structural factors - running anonymous P2P networks will guarantee
that copyright infringement over the internet will continue long into
the future, with little or no legal recourse for copyright owners.
The international copyright regime encourages the use of
technological measures, also known as Digital Rights Management
<http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/people/tfisher/PTKChapter6.pdf>; Neil Weinstock
Netanel, Impose a Noncommercial Levy to Allow Free Peer-to-peer File Sharing, 17
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1 (2003).
3. See Neil Weinstock Netanel, Asserting Copyright's Democratic Principles in
the Global Arena, 51 VAND. L. REV. 217 (1998); Joshua S. Bauchner, Globalization




technologies (DRM), to stem this tide of electronic infringement4.
This creates a system where multinational corporations are the de
facto legislators for the world, deciding what rights consumers have in
products they buy and how they can use them. This threatens the
institution of copyright by reducing it to a vaguely consensual,
permanent contractual relationship, rather than a limited monopoly
granted for the purpose of increasing innovation for the benefit of the
public.
The institution of copyright deserves protection: it serves the
public good by ensuring that authors receive compensation for their
works, encouraging creativity and scientific advancement. As
copyright is commoditized this benefit fades, until only copyright
owners derive any benefit, to the exclusion of the public and the
sizeable pool of potential derivative creators. The international
intellectual property regime should work to reverse the
commoditization of copyright and preserve principles of fair use. P2P
networks and data havens are an important speed bump in the
progress of commoditization, forcing the international copyright
regime to re-examine global patterns of consumption.
In order to avoid completely undermining copyright while
simultaneously preserving use, the international copyright regime
must balance adequate compensation for copyright owners with the
public's right to fair use. Perhaps P2P networks should require
payment from users for software that is currently available for free.
This payment could go towards a royalty paid to copyright
institutions, such as ASCAP. Or, following Canada's lead,
governments could tax MP3 player manufacturers in order to
compensate copyright owners.
Some commentators have also proposed a compensation system
in which governments impose a tax on all goods and services involved
in distribution over P2P networks and distribute the proceeds to
copyright owners based on the popularity of their content.6 This
system represents the fairest and most effective option since it avoids
over- and under-inclusion and will compensate copyright owners
through exact, technology-based measures. Whatever road
lawmakers choose, it is imperative to follow a path that will prevent
4. WIPO Copyright Treaty and Agreed Statements Concerning the WIPO
Copyright Treaty, Dec. 20 1996, arts. 11-12, 36 I.L.M. 65. [hereinafter WCT].
5. Andrew Orlowski, Canada OKs P2P Music Downloads, THE REGISTER,
(Dec. 13, 2003) available at <http://theregister.com/content/6/34504.html>.
6. See FISHER, supra note 2; see Netanel, supra note 2.
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the over-expansion of copyright and protect the public's right to fair
use of copyrighted material.
The International Copyright Regime
Background
The Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic
Works ("Berne") and its subsequent conventions, agreements and
protocols established the initial international scheme for the
protection of copyrights.7  Berne established a system of national
treatment that allowed nations to create their own copyright
protection that applied equally to citizens and non-citizens seeking
protection.8  In 1967, the United Nations Created the World
Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), which assumed control
of the existing body of international intellectual property treaties.9
WIPO not only guides what the substantive provisions of new
intellectual property treaties should be, it also counsels nations on
establishing or modifying their own intellectual property regulations."
WIPO works to educate countries about intellectual property
and update the substantive body of law, but it has no enforcement
mechanism to ensure compliance, rendering it effectively powerless
against infringement." Recognizing this weakness, the United States,
the European Union, and Switzerland established a committee to
create a trade-based sanction scheme under the auspices of the World
Trade Organization (WTO) which would punish countries that did
not comply with WIPO's substantive provisions. 2 This committee
produced the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights (TRIPS), which is an active component of the
WTO.1
3
7. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9,
1886, as revised at Paris, July 24, 1971, 828 U.N.T.S. 221.
8. Id. art. 5.
9. Convention Establishing the World Intellectual Property Organization, July
14, 1967, 828 U.N.T.S. 3.
10. Susan A. Mort, The WTO, WIPO & the Internet: Confounding the Borders of
Copyright and Neighboring Rights, 8 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.
173, 180 (2001).
11. Id.
12. Id. at 181.
13. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr.
15, 1994, pmbl., Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization,
Annex 1C, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994), available at
[Vol. 28:2
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TRIPS applied the core substantive provisions of the Berne,
Rome 4 and Paris WIPO Conventions5 to WTO member nations.16 It
preserved the principle of national treatment as the baseline for
international intellectual property law, but established WTO's dispute
resolution mechanism as a means of settling disputes over members'
non-compliance with TRIPS's substantive provisions. 7  The World
Trade Organization has since become the principle enforcer of
international copyright norms. TRIPS requires that members
ensure that enforcement procedures ... are available under their
[domestic] law so as to permit effective action against any act of
infringement of intellectual property rights covered by this
Agreement, including expeditious remedies to prevent
infringements and remedies which constitute a deterrent to further
18infringements.
In other words, member nations must establish domestic laws against
infringement, which will be enforced in domestic courts. The WTO
dispute resolution mechanism only applies when countries dispute
members' laws' compliance with TRIPS principles; all prosecution of
infringement takes place in domestic courts, which is critically
important to jurisdictional limitations on the extraterritorial
application of copyright law.
Copyright as Commodity
TRIPS requires that domestic intellectual property laws
established by member nations "be applied in such a manner as to
avoid the creation of barriers to legitimate trade and to provide for
safeguards against their abuse."' 9  Commentators argue that the
couching of intellectual property principles in a trade framework has
resulted in the commoditization of copyright, i.e., TRIPS has shifted
the perception and treatment of copyright from a device used to
<http://www.wto.org/english/docs e/legal e/27-trips_01_e.htm> thereinafter TRIPS].
14. International Convention for the Protection of Performers, Producers of
Phonograms and Broadcasting Organizations, adopted at Rome, Italy on Oct. 26,
1961, 496 U.N.T.S. 43, available at
<http://www.wipo.int/clea/docs/en/wo/wo024en.htm>.
15. Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property (July 14, 1967) 21
U.S.T. 1583, 828 U.N.T.S. 305, available at
<http://www.wipo.int/clea/docs/en/wo/wo02Oen.htm>.
16. Mort, supra note 10, at 183.
17. Id., at 184-5; TRIPS, supra note 13, Art. 64.
18. TRIPS, supra note 13, Art. 41.
19. Id.
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promote the public good through fair use and increased innovation to
an object of international trade.' Commentators, including Professor
Neil Weinstock Netanel, Joshua S. Bauchner, and Lawrence Lessig,
have associated this commoditization of copyright with the
undermining of democratic principles, the concentration of artistic
creation in the hands of an elite few, the lessening of innovative
possibilities, and decreased economic activity generally.
Professor Netanel maintains that uncommoditized copyright
fosters democratic ideology. Copyright encourages creative
expression by granting authors a monopoly in the reproduction of
their work that they may use to recover the costs of creation.2 This
support for creative expression furthers public education, inspires
debate, encourages a general sense of participation in the political
and cultural life of society, 3 and is "vital to a system of governance
predicated on citizen sovereignty and collective self-rule.
24
Additionally, copyright supports democracy by supporting creative
expression in a sphere apart from government,' ensuring that the
government will not be the sole source for cultural products.2 6
Professor Netanel also argues that copyright benefits democracy by
revealing the importance of individual creativity. 7 Because copyright
protects all expression regardless of government approval or
corporate patronage, it emphasizes the contributions of the individual
to public culture.8 This strengthens the idea of a society built on
personal liberty and undermines authoritarian ideologies.29 However,
while copyright generally aids and protects democratic principles, a
copyright that is overbroad "may stifle the very expressive diversity
and free flow of information that it should be designed to
encourage."'  Bauchner reiterates the threat of an overbroad
copyright to democratic ideals, and attributes copyright's expansion
to the current copyright regime's pegging of copyright to market
20. Netanel, supra note 3, at 219-20; Bauchner, supra note 3, at 96.
21. Bauchner, supra note 3, at 95.
22. Netanel, supra note 3, at 227.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 227-28.
26. Id. at 228.
27. Netanel, supra note 3, at 228.





principles.31 As copyright becomes a commodity instead of a tool
providing incentives for creation, the democratic benefits of an
informed public discourse fall away until eventually the public simply
consumes content instead of participating in a "free culture," as
Lawrence Lessig describes it.
32
Bauchner argues that the current copyright monopoly threatens
the public good by concentrating copyright in the hands of private
actors. In order to encourage creativity while protecting public
interest, traditional copyright grants a monopoly to authors so they
can profit from their creativity, but limits the grant so the work will
eventually become public domain.33 Bauchner contends that the
lengthy monopolies granted under the current regime damage the
public so copyright holders can expand profits?' Because copyright
owners have no competition, there is little reason for them to improve
their work. Therefore, extended copyrights diminish the public
interest in innovation by fostering a state of stagnation. 5
Lessig argues that strong, commoditized intellectual property
rights have threatened to destroy the open model that produced the
great wave of innovation surrounding the internet in the 1990s.36 The
strengthening of intellectual property rights in response to the free
flow of information over the internet has distorted creativity by
shifting content into the control of the largest copyright owners and
away from the public, who could produce more innovative works.37
As intellectual property rights grow stronger, the amount of new
innovation decreases, and the public suffers from a drop in the
amount of creative material available.
Bauchner asserts that the commoditization of copyright has
resulted in a centralization of copyright ownership so that some
players in the global market can set prices with no risk of outside
competition? 8 These players buy and sell ownership rights with no
concern for the beneficial effects of free distribution to the public.
39
31. Bauchner, supra note 3, at 96.
32. LAWRENCE LEssIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS: THE FATE OF THE COMMONS IN A
CONNECTED WORLD 9 (2001).
33. Bauchner, supra note 3, at 97.
34. Id. at 97-98.
35. Id. at 97.
36. Lawrence Lessig, The Death of Cyberspace, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 337, 343
(2000).
37. Bauchner, supra note 3, at 97.
38. Id., at 102-03.
39. Id., at 103.
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Moreover, because copyright has become a commodity, the incentive
for creativity is lost: the goal becomes a search for further profit,
which results in more works, but less creativity and diversity among
them.'
Bauchner applies this theoretical framework to the music
industry, which he casts as a "definitive example" of the dangers of a
commoditized copyright.' In fact, 43 states sued three of the biggest
United States music companies, charging them with fixing the prices
of compact disks ("CDs") from 1995-2000, and received a settlement
in which the companies agreed to pay $67.4 million to the states and
to distribute $75.7 million in CDs to public and non-profit groups.42
While the settlement does not conclusively establish the truth or
falsity of the original allegations, amount of compensation suggests
tacit admission of price-distortion, and supports the assertion that
centralized ownership of copyright has distorted the marketplace for
ideas.
A recent policy report published by the Digital Connections
Council of the Committee for Economic Development builds upon
the idea that intellectual property rights centralized in the hands of
43content owners will adversely affect innovation and the economy.
The report concludes that intellectual property regimes should not
concentrate rights in the hands of initial copyright owners in order to
preserve the economic potential of innovation and creativity.4
Owners are not usually the original creators of the work, but
companies whose business it is to market the work to the public.
5
Over-protection of the rights of these owners focuses on preserving a
certain business model instead of encouraging innovation.46
Intellectual property rights should retain their historical balance
between the rights of initial owners and the rights of "follow-on
innovators," who innovations build upon ideas that have come
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Lisa M. Bowman, Labels Pay to Settle Price-fixing Suit, ZDNET.COM, (Sept.
30, 2002), at <http://zdnet.com.com/2100-1106-960183.html>.
43. Digital Connections Council, Committee for Economic Development,
Promoting Innovation and Economic Growth: the Special Problem of Digital
Intellectual Property (March, 2004), available at
<http://www.ced.org/docs/report/report-dcc.pdf>.
44. Id. at 19.




before.47 This balance will benefit the public by ensuring that it has
greater access to creative works and preserving innovation as "the
engine of economic growth.""
Bauchner argues that the internet represents the tool with which
the public will be able to reclaim copyright. 9 The internet's capability
to disseminate information together with its capacity to decentralize
the production of creative works, suggests that the "over-expansive
copyright regime, founded on market motivations, will ultimately fail
when confronted by the effects of global democratization
strengthened by the power of the Internet."5 The pressures that the
internet places on the international copyright regime will force it to
reverse the trend towards commoditization and adopt a new strategy
for rewarding copyright holders. Thus, a new player enters the
stage...
P2P Pirates and Copyright Commandoes
... and changes everything. P2P has been around for a long
time, and has been used for everything from distributed computing
for scientific projects to systems that share data over corporate
intranets. Because of Napster, P2P will always be associated by the
public with music. Napster provided a service whereby a user could
search for a particular music title in the index of files on Napster's
server, then download a recording of the song from another user's
hard drive." Napster never had a single music file on their server, but
did store the index of available songs on its own equipment .
Because of the location of the index on a centralized server, Napster
actually represented an impure form of P2P, as P2P technically
requires no centralized server at all.53 The service was wildly popular
and attracted an estimated 65 million users across the globe by 2001.'4
A United States District Court judge ruled that the service damaged
47. Id. at 19.
48. Id.
49. Bauchner, supra note 3, at 116.
50. Id.
51. Catherine Lee, P2P Technology on Trial Again: The Grokster and Streamcast
Cases, 8 No. 5 CYBERSPACE LAWYER 9, (2003).
52. Id.
53. PEER-TO-PEER: HARNESSING THE POWER OF DISRUPTIVE TECHNOLOGIES 15
(Andy Oram ed., O'Reilly Publishers 2001).
54. Lee, supra note 51.
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the music industry and ordered a preliminary injunction55 that was
upheld by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.56 After further legal
issues, Napster removed its online presence halfway through 2001."?
Other services sprang up to fill the void left by Napster's demise,
many of them boasting a litigation-proof structure as a benefit to
users (and investors). 8 This assertion was put to the test in recent
litigation against several P2P networks, the companies that operate
them, and the companies that wrote the underlying software. 9 The
district court granted partial summary judgment after finding that the
defendant P2P networks, Grokster and Morpheus (StreamCast
Networks), had not vicariously or contributorily infringed upon the
plaintiffs' copyright since the networks neither materially contributed
to the infringement nor had the right and ability to supervise the
infringing conduct.60 This decision was upheld by the Ninth Circuit.6'
The primary difference between these networks and Napster is
that neither Grokster nor Morpheus carried an index of files on their
61central server. Instead, at the time of the suit they utilized
FastTrack software, which connects users to a "supernode," a fast
computer with a high-bandwidth internet connection that belongs to
another user.6' The index of available songs lies on the supernode,
which forwards requests for downloads to other users' hard drives. 
4
This all takes place independently of the P2P networks, and the
companies organizing the service never have control over the
process. 65
The appellate court's decision has temporarily closed the door on
suits against P2P networks employing FastTrack or similar software
architectures, 66 although the Supreme Court has granted certiorari
55. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896 (N.D. Cal. 2000).
56. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).
57. Lee, supra note 51.
58. Id.
59. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 259 F. Supp. 2d 1029
(C.D. Cal. 2003).
60. Lee, supra note 51.









and will hear oral arguments in the case on March 29, 2005.67 The
copyright owners did not wait for the ruling, however, and the RIAA,
which represents 90% of music recording companies in the United
States,6 commenced suits against individuals using the networks,
rather than against the networks themselves." Criminal prosecutions
in other countries soon followed7" and the International Federation of
the Phonographic Industry (IFPI), the international equivalent of the
RIAA, predicts worldwide civil lawsuits to commence in the near
future.71
It appears that the stage has been set to determine whether the
democratic internet will indeed conquer the current overbroad
copyright regime. Copyright owners' have begun to use the coercive
power of the state to curtail the threat to their property posed by
internet techologies A showdown has ensued between the internet
community and ownership interests in copyright material. The
fundamental idea of intellectual property sits directly in the line of
fire.
Intellectual property has value only to the extent that it is
protected by law.73  If the law offers no protection against
downloading, the trend towards commoditization of copyright will
slow and eventually cease. The institution of copyright might become
irrelevant altogether, which could have similar chilling effects on
67. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 125 S.Ct. 686 (2004);
U.S. Supreme Court Oral Argument Schedule, March 2005, at
<http://www.supremecourtus.gov/oral-arguments/argument-calendars/monthlyargu
mentcalmarch2005.pdf>.
68. Recording Industry Association of America, About us, at
<http://www.riaa.com/about/default.asp>.
69. Ashlee Vance, RIAA Sues 261 Evil-doers, THE REGISTER, (Aug. 9, 2003),
available at <http://theregister.co.uk/content/archive/32717.html>.
70. John Leyden, 'Anonymous' P2P Users Busted in Japan, THE REGISTER, (Dec.
12, 2003), available at <http://www.theregister.com/content/6/34304.html>. See also
Drew Cullen, Aussie Students Escape Jail for Online Music Piracy, THE REGISTER,
(Nov. 19, 2003), available at <http://theregister.com/content/6/34074.html>.
71. Owen Gibson, Music Piracy Lawsuits 'Inevitable,' MediaGuardian.co.uk, (Jan.
22, 2004), available at
<http://media.guardian.co.uk/newmedia/story/0,7496,1128871,00.html>.
72. California State Senator Murray has introduced a bill that would criminalize
P2P vendors who do not exercise "reasonable care" to ensure that users of their
software do not infringe copyrights. Conviction would carry punishments of fines up
to $2,500, jail time up to one year, or both. See
http://info.sen.ca.gov/pub/bill/sen/sb_0051-
0100/sb_96_bill_20050114_introduced.html.
73. Keith Aoki, (Intellectual) Property and Sovereignty: Notes Towards a Cultural
Geography of Authorship, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1293, 1295 (1996).
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innovation and the flow of ideas as commoditization. It could also
cause the web content industry to package DRM with its product,
which would result in the public's fair use right being determined by
private industry rather than the legislature. The outcome of the
battle over P2P hangs on whether the international legal system can
enforce global copyright on the apparently borderless internet.
Data Havens: Your Country's Law Ain't No Good Here
Copyright owners have lobbied the United States Congress for
relief from P2P networks, going so far as to equate them with child
pornography. 4 The music industry wants legislative barriers erected
against P2P networks since their legal assault on file-sharers has not
had an appreciable effect on P2P activity." File-sharers wish to keep
their activity anonymous to avoid any litigation. These pressures
could result in the increased importance of data havens (countries or
quasi-sovereigns that harbor outlawed technologies and activities
such as online gambling operations). 6 Data havens could harbor P2P
networks or create anonymous P2P systems. Because data havens
exist outside the territorial or enforcement jurisdictions of other
countries, wiping P2P networks out of existence will remain difficult,
if not impossible. As a result of its jurisdictional shortcomings, the
international copyright regime will have to face the P2P issue and
rollback the tide of commoditization.
Legal bases for international jurisdiction have traditionally
broken down into a nation's jurisdiction to prescribe, adjudicate, and
enforce. 9 Prescriptive jurisdiction occurs when a sovereign nation
prescribes conduct harmful to the state.' Nations base this authority
on the fact that the conduct takes place within its borders (the
74. Thomas C. Greene, Music Lobby Frightens Congress with P2P Kiddie-porn
Nightmares, THE REGISTER, (October 9, 2003), available at
<http://theregister.com/content/archive/32762.html> (discusses how RIAA president
Cary Sherman pressured congress to protect the RIAA's profits).
75. John Lettice, P2P File Swapping Back on the Increase, THE REGISTER,
(January 16, 2004), available at <http://theregister.com/content/6/34936.html>.
76. HavenCo's official website, at <www.havenco.com>.
77. Deborah Halpert, Intellectual Property in the Year 2025, 49 J. COPYRIGHT
Soc'Y U.S.A. 225, 247 (2001).
78. Asaad Siddiqi, Welcome to the City of Bytes? An Assessment of the
Traditional Methods Employed in the International Application of Jurisdiction over
the Internet Activities - Including a Critique of Suggested Approaches, 14 N.Y. INT'L
L. REV. 43, 92 (2001).
79. Id. at 55.
80. Id. at 56.
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territoriality principle) that its own nationals engage in the conduct
(the nationality principle), or that the effects of the conduct are felt
within the state (the effects principle).,' The effects principle takes on
particular importance in the context of the internet, since actions
taken outside a state's territory can easily have an effect within the
state.82 Countries in most instances will have an internationally
recognizable approved basis for prescribing certain forms of conduct
on the internet.
The jurisdiction to adjudicate constitutes the minimum
requirement for a sovereign court to hear a case.83 Most nations
establish their own specific requirements, but generally require a
relationship between the parties and the forum. ' Even if a state has
adjudicative jurisdiction, enforcement issues will limit the efficacy of
many decisions involving the internet. The jurisdiction to enforce
decisions gives rise to some of the stickiest questions of sovereignty in
international law, since it necessarily limits the power of states to
enforce conflicting judgments resulting from the proper exercise of
their adjudicative jurisdiction.85
Yahoo!I, Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme et L'Antisemitisme
86
offers a fine example of this principle's application to the internet.
The case involved a French court's decision that Yahoo!, a popular
provider of internet services, had violated French anti-hate laws by
allowing online auction postings for Nazi memorabilia.' Yahoo!
brought a suit against the French agencies, alleging that any
enforcement of the French court's decision by a U.S. institution
would go against Yahoo!'s constitutional right to free expression.
The federal district court held that enforcement of the French
decision would indeed violate Yahoo!'s First Amendment rights.'
Thus, the French order was unenforceable against Yahoo!. The
Ninth Circuit overturned the district court decision on jurisdictional
grounds,89 leaving the substantive questions open. According to the
81. Id. at 56-59.
82. Id. at 59.
83. Id. at 61.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 63.
86. Yahoo!, Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme et L'Antisemitisme, 169 F. Supp.
2d 1181 (N.D. Cal. 2001), rev'd, 379 F.3d 1120 (9th Cir. 2004), vacated, reh'g en banc
granted 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 2166 (9th Cir. Feb. 10, 2005).
87. Id.
88. Id. at 1189-90.
89. Yahoo!, Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme et L'Antisernitisme, 379 F.3d
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district court, the French government had prescriptive jurisdiction to
regulate racist expression in France and adjudicative jurisdiction to
decide whether its regulations had been violated. However, it did not
have the jurisdiction to enforce its decision against Yahoo! since the
company's assets all resided in sovereign nation in which France's
judicial decision did not hold sway. France could not exercise its
enforcement jurisdiction over property in the United States without
the authorization of the U.S. courts because the United States has its
own sovereign rights. The U.S. district court refused to enforce the
order since it would violate U.S. domestic law,' leaving the French
agency with a worthless decision.
The Yahoo! case demonstrates the difficulties that a state would
face attempting to enforce its copyright laws against a data haven with
sovereign or quasi-sovereign rights. A sovereign or quasi-sovereign
nation acting as a data haven could refuse to enforce decisions of
other courts if it decided that the substantive9' or jurisdictional 92 basis
for enforcing the decision was lacking.
Data havens can exist in many forms. I propose that the basic
requirements for a data haven should be sovereign or quasi-sovereign
rights against interference from other nations, non-membership in
WIPO or TRIPS, and some immunity from sanction by the major
copyright-holding nations. These characteristics ensure that other
nations cannot invade the haven to enforce judgments against the
haven's citizens, use the WTO dispute resolution system to compel
implementation of the WIPO system, or use embargoes or blockades
to force the haven to comply with foreign orders. A relatively self-
sufficient island or former colony with no ties to the international
intellectual property regime would satisfy these conditions, as does
the artificial island of Sealand.
Sealand Ho!
The structure known as Sealand began as an anti-aircraft
1120 (9th Cir. 2004) , vacated, reh'g en banc granted 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 2166 (9th
Cir. Feb. 10, 2005). The French agencies had not committed a wrongful act such that
personal jurisdiction over them in California would be proper. Yahoo! has to wait
until the French agencies bring an action to enforce the French decision to bring a
suit.
90. Yahoo!, 169 F. Supp. 2d at 1192-93.
91. See Yahoo!, supra note 86.
92. Frank B. Arenas, Cyberspace Jurisdiction and the Implications of Sealand, 88
IOWA L. REV. 1165, 1193-94 (2003).
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platform constructed by the British in the North Sea during World
War 1.93 It consists of a metal platform on two hollow concrete tubes
sunken into the seabed.94 Most of the similar platforms built during
the war were dismantled, but Sealand's platform lay outside British
territorial waters and was never destroyed." Paddy Roy Bates, a
former officer in the British military, occupied the structure, declared
himself the sovereign ruler, and settled there with his family. 96
Sealand has had several tests of its sovereignty, including an
English court case and an invasion by German and Dutch nationals.97
The English court sided with Bates, dropping the charges of firing on
Royal Navy ships that had come to reclaim the island on grounds that
Britain had no jurisdiction over the platform.98 In 1978, a group of
German and Dutch nationals invaded Sealand and captured the
platform, but Bates retook Sealand and kept the invaders as prisoners
of war.Y Germany asked Britain to negotiate for the Germans'
release, but Britain refused, claiming that Sealand was not within its
jurisdiction. 1m° Finally, Germany sent a diplomat to negotiate with
Bates and secured the release of the German nationals.'1 These tests
of Sealand's sovereignty reveal that the platform has a recognized
level of sovereignty, even if it doesn't satisfy all of the requirements
for statehood in international law.'0
International law, through the Montevideo Convention, requires
government, territory, the capacity to carry on diplomatic relations
with other states, and a fixed population in order to achieve
recognition as a sovereign nation.0 3 Sealand has a government,
although it has largely ceded control of the platform to a single
corporation, HavenCo, which operates computer services. 1°4  The
platform is territory, but it is unclear whether man-made structures
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satisfy the territory requirement or whether Britain has given up its
claim to the continental shelf under the platform."" The negotiations
with Germany show that Sealand can carry on relations with other
countries, but England and the United States have both denied the
existence of Sealand as an independent stateY' 6 Finally, Sealand's
lack of a permanent population precludes it from official statehood
under the Montevideo Convention."° Despite not meeting all criteria
for statehood, the "quasi-legal halo that surrounds the island
continues to pose potential jurisdictional problems for plaintiffs in the
United States and elsewhere."' '
Because Sealand is not a sovereign nation, it cannot join the
international copyright regime, and is unlikely to agree to abide by
international copyright law. According to one source, it has enough
supplies to withstand a yearlong siege."° Its major weakness is its
internet connections themselves, which consist of fiber-optic cables
running into London and Amsterdam, which could be shut down by
the government of either country at any time."' Despite this
weakness, Sealand is a near-perfect embodiment of a data haven.
HavenCo currently operates a colocation service in Sealand that hosts
secure email servers and online gambling services."' However,
HavenCo will not host spam, malicious hacking programs, and child
pornography."' HavenCo specifically states that it has no policy
concerning music sharing programs.1
3
In light of the RIAA's campaign to sue major uploaders of
copyrighted material, HavenCo's colocation services might be used to
establish a supernode on Sealand, beyond the reach of an RIAA
lawsuit. A Canadian website operator even threatened to establish a
P2P network on Sealand in 2001 when the Napster decision
endangered the existence of P2P networks in the United States.114 If
the content industries succeed in pressuring national legislatures to
105. Id. at 1174-79.
106. Id. at 1179-81.
107. Id. at 1173-74.
108. Id. at 1181.
109. Id. at 1197.
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111. HavenCo's official website, supra note 76.
112. HavenCo, Acceptable Use Policy, at <http://www.havenco.com/legal/aup.html
(Sept. 10, 2001)>.
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114. Gwendolyn Mariano, File-swapping Services Seek Refuge Overseas,
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outlaw P2P networks, the networks would probably migrate to
Sealand or other data havens in order to continue operations. Even if
content-owners choose to distribute their content with DRM to
prevent file-sharing, Sealand and other data havens could act as a
repository for DRM-free versions of the content. DRM is a relatively
weak form of protection and can easily be broken by an expert.115
While illegal under the international copyright regime,"' the very act
of breaking the DRM could occur within the physical area of a data
haven, which would render it outside the jurisdiction of disapproving
nations. After the DRM is broken, P2P operators in the data havens
could make the content available for download globally.
The existence of data havens will have a profound impact on file-
trading over the internet and will influence the future form of global
copyright. Since file-sharing activities continue in data havens that
are accessible across the globe through the Internet, there is very little
protection against digital infringement under the current
international copyright regime. In order to avoid being undermined,
the regime should shift to an alternate compensation structure that
does not rely on commoditized copyright to provide incentive for
creative innovation.
What's the Solution?
Copyright serves a vital purpose in a democratic society: it
promotes the free exchange of ideas and encourages innovation. The
entire public benefits from a richer, more vibrant culture. When
copyright expands beyond what was originally intended to a
commodity available for trade on the open market, the public benefit
disappears as fair use dwindles and centralization of production
encourages homogeneity and price-fixing. P2P networks and data
havens represent an important check on the trend towards
commoditization, but they also threaten the very institution of
copyright by stealing creators' product and preventing them from
receiving compensation. In order to protect both the institution of
copyright and the public's right to fair use, the global copyright
regime must compromise with the P2P phenomenon and generate
middle ground whereby both the public and the private may prosper.
Many systems have been proposed to compensate copyright
holders while preserving the existing P2P networks. The Canadian
115. See Netanel, supra note 2, at 9-11.
116. See WCT, supra note 4.
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Copyright Board recently adopted a system whereby the
manufacturers of MP3 players and similar devices would pay a tax to
copyright owners."' The system allows for file-sharing across P2P
networks, but places a tax on fixed media players (music players with
fixed hard drives rather than removable storage such as CDs) at a
rate dependent on the storage capacity of the hardware.18 The tax
goes to groups representing songwriters, record companies, and
performers."9 The manufacturers of such devices will be able to pass
the cost of the tax to consumers through price increases.
While there is no way to ensure that consumers who actually use
P2P networks bear the brunt of the tax, the Canadian Copyright
Board's action is a step towards a system where artists and record
companies receive compensation for their work while the public
receives the benefits of file-sharing over the internet. The system
could expand to include recordable CDs and DVDs, hard drives, and
removable memory such as CompactFlash cards, spreading the cost
among a wider group of consumers and resulting in less dramatic
price increases. Even with these proposed amendments, the system
would still suffer from the possibility of both over- and under-
inclusion. Since the tax would apply to users of fixed-storage devices
and removable storage media regardless of whether they use P2P
services, the tax would affect some users who own such devices and
media but do not use P2P, as well as overlook P2P users who do not
own the devices or media.
A more closely tailored system will be necessary to ensure that
over- and under-inclusion is minimized. The system proposed by
Professor Netanel represents the most effective, fairest alternative
compensation system, and should be adopted internationally.
Professor Netanel proposes that governments impose a
"noncommercial use levy 12' (NUL), which would apply to all
consumer goods and services "whose value is substantially enhanced
by P2P file sharing,' ' 22 including internet access, home computers,
consumer electronics such as CD/DVD recorders and mp3 players,
P2P software and services, and removable media. 3 The NUL would
117. Orlowski, supra note 5.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. See Netanel, supra note 2.





limit the amount of over- and under-inclusionby targeting a wide
variety of goods and services, and could be tailored to tax the items at
risk of over-inclusion at a lower rate than the items at risk of under-
inclusion. P2P services could be required to monitor and report the
number of downloads each song or movie receives to a government
agency.' The copyright-holder would then receive a proportional
remuneration for the use of their work from the NUL funds.
125
Professor William Fisher recommends that copyright holders register
their works with the government body in charge of administering the
NUL so songs could then be digitally "tagged" to enable
identification over the P2P network.
126
Since the NUL system would modify the existing copyright
regime, national governments would have to impose the levy, then
distribute the proceeds to artists. Some countries will likely refuse to
implement the NUL, while others will argue that foreign NULs
under-compensate their copyright-holders. Therefore, WIPO and
TRIPS should adopt substantive provisions requiring member
countries to create a NUL and list the requirements for NULs in
member countries. This would allow countries to bargain for the
inclusion of certain products and services during negotiations over the
new provisions, require members of the WTO to adopt an NUL, and
funnel disagreements over the compensation of international artists
through the WTO dispute resolution mechanism. The new
substantive provisions could also establish an international
organization to monitor file sharing and determine proper
compensation for copyright owners.
Instead of attacking users and the technologies that drive the
internet, the music industry should profit from the sharing of files
across P2P networks. Professor Netanel's model for an international
compensation scheme is very fair and uniform, but other proposed
methods27 might become more attractive for practical reasons as
political, legal, and technological realities change.
Conclusion
The international intellectual property regime has expanded and
124. Id. at 52-54.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. For a proposal of different ways to protect copyright while preserving file-
sharing, see Electronic Frontier Foundation, Making P2P Pay Artists, at
<http://www.eff.org/share/compensation.php>.
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commoditized copyright over the last 50 years until the public benefit
has all but disappeared. P2P networks represent the back swing of
the pendulum, as the internet begins to restore the balance between
public use and private profit. Data havens may ensure that P2P
networks or any future file-sharing system will prosper on the internet
by placing them outside the jurisdictional reach of countries within
the international copyright regime. A system that passes the cost of
P2P networks on to their users will ensure that copyright holders will
receive compensation for their work while the public will benefit from
a more open exchange of copyrighted material.
